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The Impact of Defense Expenditure on 
Industrial Development in the Arab Gulf 
ROBERT E. LOONEY 
Since the mid-1970s the Gulf economies have experienced an unprece-
dented growth in economic output and industrial production. The benefits 
of rapid increases in oil revenues were also distributed to neighboring 
countries through financial assistance, expanded trade, and jobs for 
skilled and unskilled workers. 
Concurrent with rapid economic growth was an acceleration in regional 
military spending. Military purchases were partially financed by oil 
revenues and by military aid and grants from the major arms suppliers. 1 
During this period, military expenditures have averaged around 30 per 
cent of central government expenditures. This compares with an average 
of around 20 per cent for most developing countries. Military expenditure 
per capita averaged around $500, while the average for developing 
countries as a whole was about $50. While the armed forces per 1,000 
people averaged around 15 for the Middle East, developing countries, as 
a whole, experienced rates of only five per 1,000 people.2 
Ironically, this increase in military expenditures coincided with rates of 
rapid growth throughout the Middle East. During the 1973-82 oil boom 
period the average annual economic growth rate in the Middle East was 
about 6.0 per cent while military expenditures grew by approximately 
13.0 per cent per year. Although military expenditure levels vary across 
countries, in most of the countries the growth rate of military spending 
outpaced economic growth and, perhaps, even expenditures for economic 
development. 3 This indicates a striking pattern in the region toward higher 
military burdens.4 
To date most of the analysis concerning Middle Eastern military 
expenditure has focused on strategic issues and the resulting shifts in 
regional military balance stemming from the recent explosion in defense 
expenditures. Most recently, analysts have begun examining the likely 
composition and extent of military sales to the region following the 
successful resolution of the Kuwaiti crisis. 
Those studies examining the economic effects from defense expendi-
tures have focused largely on the identification of linkages between 
defense expenditures and overall economic &rowth. These studies have 
provided some insight about the shorter term economic costs (and 
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occasional benefits) provided by defense expenditures. However, longer 
term factors such as effects on industrial growth may determine whether 
the Gulf military buildup has seriously retarded (or possibly aided) the 
eventual development of viable economies. 
Given the increased concern over the consequences of a new military 
buildup in the region, the analysis below examines the impact, if any, of 
military expenditures on the industrial° development of the Arab Gulf 
states. Have military expenditures stimulated increased levels of industrial 
output or, perhaps by diverting resources away from industrial activity, 
have defense expenditures depressed the expansion of the region's 
industrial development? 
MILITARY EXPENDITURES AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE 
Historicaliy, most analyses on the economic impacts of aefense 
expenditures in the Gulf region have concentrated on possible growth 
effects (either positive or negative) stemming from increased defense 
burdens. While not dealing with the issue of industrialization directly, 
these studies do provide information concerning the types of impact on 
manufacturing stemming from increased military burdens. 
For example, in the case of Saudi Arabia military expenditures: 5 
1. They have had a net positive impact on the country's overall gross 
capital formation. That is, after controlling for government expendi-
tures and oil revenues, increases in military expenditures have had a 
net stimulating effect on investment in the Kingdom. The same also 
applies to non-oil investmen~. 
2. They do not appear to stimulate either total private-sector expenditures 
or consumption. Again government investment appears particularly 
productive in contributing to increased levels of private sector con-
sumption. 
3. They do not appear to increase levels of imports nearly as much as do 
the overall levels of government expenditures or oil revenues. 
4. They appear to induce private-sector investment. On the other hand 
government investment crowded out or preempted resources that 
might otherwise fl.ow toward this sector. 
5. In the net, military expenditures appear to contribute more to overall 
demand than does government consumption. The stimulating effect 
of military expenditures on other types of government expenditures 
reinforced this effect. 
In short military expenditures in the Saudi Arabian context appear to 
have (in addition to their security value) several significant impacts on the 
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private sector, not all of which are negative. In particular, several of the 
major areas of private sector activity appear to derive more of a stimulus 
from defense expenditures than from other forms of government alloca-
tions. The same also appears to apply to the overall level of gross capital 
formation and non-oil investment. 
These results suggest that a careful shifting of government allocations 
from public sector consumption to capital formation (providing that 
profitable areas for investment have not been exhausted), rather than 
across-the-board reductions in military expenditures is the most productive 
policy open to the authorities for contributing to private sector expansion. 
The Iranian context presents a completely different case. To what 
extent did excessive military expenditures in the 1970s contribute to the 
economic instability preceding the revolution ?6 It appears that the Iranian 
economy received positive net benefits from defense expenditures in the 
1960s. However, this relationship broke down in the 1970s. Instead,· 
military expenditures, perhaps through the bottlenecks they created, had 
a negative impact on several sectors. 
The same was true for investment in certain key areas of the economy. 
These negative effects were not associated with other types of government 
expenditures. From this it is safe to conclude that defense expenditures 
were unique in their marginal negative impact on private sector output 
after the 1973-74 revenue boom. 
Again these findings are consistent with cross section analysis that 
indicates that resource-constrained countries experience negative impacts 
from military expenditures. On the other hand those economies not 
constrained by foreign exchange and domestic savings experience positive 
impacts from increased allocations to defense.7 
IMPACT OF GOVERNMENT EXPENDITURES ON INDUSTRIAL 
DIVERSIFICATION 
The above studies provide valuable insights in which military expenditures 
affect economic performance in the Arab world. They are, however, 
somewhat silent about how these effects occur. In particular, it is not 
always apparent whether in these studies the military burden simply acts 
in some way as the statistical proxy for government expenditures. As 
noted, the size of the government is likely to have a positive direct effect 
(Keynesian). A negative indirect effect (crowding out) on private sector 
activity is also a possibility. Are the net impacts of these effects similar or 
opposite for defense and non-defense governmental expenditures? 
In this regard, defense expenditures may retard industrial development 
because of their potential to cause: 8 • 
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1. Decreases in private consumption because fewer resources (including 
foreign exchange) are available to the civilian sector. 
2. Decreases in civilian imports, and even balance of payments difficulties 
due to increased military imports. 
3. Increases in inflation due to increased government budget deficits. 
4. Distortions in the pricing system because military procurements are 
not made in open, competitive markets. 
5. Shortages of managerial skills and skilled workers in a labor-constrained 
civilian sector, leading to reduced productivity and growth. 
6. A distribution of income for the military and against the civilian 
sector, and 
7. Increases in the political power of the military. In turn, this may result 
in the preempting of goods from the civilian sector. 
Many of these effects combine in the oil exporting countries to produce 
the so-called 'Dutch Disease effect9 - the increased profitability, through 
exchange rate movements and international inflation, 10 of non-traded 
activities such as services and construction and, simultaneously, the 
reduced profitability of traded goods such as agricultural and industrial 
products. 11 
In the developed countries (in particular Holland) where this pheno-
menon was first observed, de-industrialization has taken place. In the 
case of OPEC members, the result has been a fall in domestic production 
of traded agricultural and industrial goods, and an expansion of con-
struction and services. 
The traditional Dutch Disease oriented approach to the analysis of oil 
booms stresses the factors associated with the appreciation of the real 
exchange rate, driven by a rise in the relative price of non-traded goods. 
The relative price shift causes a reallocation of labor towards the non-
traded sector, a rise in the output of non-traded goods and a fall in the 
output of traded goods. Returns to capital in non-traded activities rise, 
while returns in traded activities fall. 
THE RELATIVE IMPACT OF DEFENSE AND GENERAL GOVERNMENT 
EXPENDITURES 
In sum, empirical studies of oil-based government expenditures have 
been pessimistic. Studies focusing on the impact of defense expenditures 
stress the retarding effect of these allocations on overall growth. Studies 
focused on general or total governmental expenditures, especially in 
oil-rich countries, indicate that the side effects associated with these 
expenditures often depress industrial 1nvestment and development. 
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Obviously, for policy purposes it is important to determine the manner 
in which government expenditures in general and defense expenditures in 
particular influence industrial development: 
1. Are these effects largely direct? Is the diversion of labor, capital and 
foreign exchange from the industrial sector, or are they of the indirect 
type associated with the Dutch Disease? 
2. Are there additional consequences such as accelerated growth stemming 
from government expenditures strong enough to neutralize or even 
offset any possible disincentives to industrial investment and expansion 
associated with public sector expenditures? 
3. Are military expenditures more likely than non-military allocations to 
affect industrial development and diversification? 
To examine these issues an analysis 12 was made of the patterns of 
government expenditures and manufacturing output 13 in a sample of the 
twenty Arab countries. 14 In estimating the impact of government expendi-
tures on industrial growth and diversification, it is assumed that the 
sectoral share of manufacturing output at some point in time was a 
function of: (a) manufacturing output in the base year (1974), (b) the 
share of government expenditures in economic activity, ( c) the appre-
ciation of the real foreign exchange rate, the Dutch Disease effect, and 
(d) real per-capita economic growth. 
The interesting aspect was the finding of little correlation between total 
government expenditures and those allocated to defense. In addition, and 
somewhat contrary to popular belief, military expenditures in the Gulf 
are determined by factors other than overall budgetary considerations or 
the ability to finance expenditures out of sources such as oil revenues. 
Finally, several country patterns stand out: 
1. The oil countries, except for the UAE, have relatively high levels of 
governmental expenditures. Except for Bahrain and Kuwait, the same 
also applies to military expenditures. 
2. Again except for the UAE and Bahrain, the oil countries are at a 
somewhat lower stage of industrial development and diversification. 
3. Finally, there is little association between total government expendi-
tures and defense expenditures in the Arab world. Notable exceptions 
are Bahrain, Libya, Egypt, Sudan and Morocco. 
The next step in the analysis was to test for the relative importance of 
government expenditures in affecting the pattern of industrial develop-
ment and diversification. For this purpose estimates were made for three 
periods: 1985, 1983 and 1977. 
Both 1983 and 1977 were selected beca\ise they represented the 
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conditions after the effects of the first (1973-74) and second (1978-79) 
oil price shocks had worked themselves out. On the other hand, 1985 
represents the year before the dramatic 1986 price collapse. 
It appears that: 
1. Dutch Disease factors were relatively important in the latter periods in 
affecting the development of the manufacturing factor. In this regard, 
Dutch Disease effects were slightly more important than real per 
capita growth in affecting manufacturing by 1985. 
2. By 1983, however, real per capita growth had a slightly stronger effect 
on the region's industrial development. 
3. By 1977, however, neither per-capita growth nor the Dutch Disease 
effects had made much of an impact on the region's industrial develop-
ment. 
4. Higher levels of total government expenditures and governmental non-
defense expenditures have been associated with depressed develop-
ment of the industrial sector. 
5. This pattern is not simply a spurious correlation in that it does not 
reflect that high levels of government expenditure are found in 
countries with dominant oil sectors. Except for a weak association in 
1983, development of the oil sector was not statistically significant in 
explaining the pattern of relative industrial development in the Gulf. 
6. In contrast to total governmental expenditures and those for non-
defense activities, military expenditures do not appear to have affected 
Arab world industrial development over the 1974-85 period. While 
this term had a negative sign in each of the years examined, it was not 
statistically significant in any instance. 
CONCLUSlOl"\I~ 
While commonsense dictates that shifting public allocations from military 
toward productive activities would result in a net positive stimulus to 
industrial development, the results presented above indicate that there is 
little evidence this is the case in the Arab world. In fact, other types of 
governmental expenditures in the Gulf states have a relatively strong 
depressing effect on the region's industrial diversification efforts. 
The finding that defense expenditures are rather neutral concerning 
industrial growth is consistent with other studies using time series analysis 
for individual countries. Apparently, allocations to defense can have a 
net negative impact on industrial development, but this is most likely to 
occur only during periods of particularly rapid acceleration in expenditures. 
Perhaps the novel finding of the pre~ent study is the negative impact on 
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industrial development produced by non-defense expenditures. At this 
point one can only speculate about the source of these problems. Because 
Dutch Disease and growth effects were controlled for, crowding out 
(of private investment) effects are the chief mechanism through which 
government expenditures affect industrial development. It is not at all 
clear, however, why these should be any greater than a similar pre-
emption of sources associated with military expenditures. 
Our findings suggest that additional estimates should be made of the 
impact of other types of government expenditures. This is especially the 
case of the economic impact of public sector administration and services. 
It may well turn out that these expenditures have higher opportunity costs 
than those associated with defense. 
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